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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEARA ANN DE\TEREAUX, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, 
a corporation, and HAROLD J. 
McKEEVER, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8472 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
(Numbers in p~arenthe'Ses refer to pages of the reoord. 
The parties will be referred to here as they appeared in 
the trial court.) 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of no 
cause of action ( 195) entered in favor of defendants not-
withstanding a verdict was rendered by ,a jury in plain-
tiff's favor for $5,465.00 (190A). 
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This is an action to recover for personal injuries 
suffered by plaintiff in an automobile collision which 
occurred on the north slope of Lindon Hill in Utah 
County, State of Utah. Defendant ~IcKeever was an em-
ployee of defendant General Electric Company and was 
driving his automobile in the course of his employment 
(5). After a trial to a jury, a verdict was returned in 
favor of plaintiff and against defendants, assessing gen-
eral damages in the sum of $5,000.00 and special damages 
in the sum of $465.00 ( 190A). 
A judgment was entered May 25, 1955, in favor of 
plaintiff on this verdict· Thereafter the court entered an 
a1nended judgment cutting the special damages to $199.90 
(190), leaving a total judgn1ent of $5,199.90 (191). De-
fendants moved the court to set aside the verdict and to 
enter a judgment in favor of defendants in accordance 
with their motion for a directed verdict and that if that 
motion be denied to set aside the judgment and grant a 
new trial ( 192). November 21, 1955, the trial court grant-
ed defendants' 1notion for a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict and denied the motion for a new trial (194). 
Pursuant to this order .a judgn1ent "\Yas entered of no 
cause of action against plaintiff. Fro1u this judgment 
plaintiff appeals. 
The review presented by this app·eal relates only to 
defendants' liability. No question arises concerning dam-
ages. We will not discuss the injuries or damages which 
plaintiff suffered. Suffice it to say that in the collision 
she received injuries to her back, abdomen and head. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The scene of this case is laid in Utah County in and 
between Provo and Orem, and on the highway a little 
to the north. This action arise~s out of a collision between 
defendants' northbound automobile as it ran into the left 
side of plaintiff's automobile as she was making a "lT" 
turn. This was on June 30, 1954 between 10:00 and 
10:30 p.m. 
Earlier that evening plaintiff discovered her hus-
band's Packard car in front of the home of a Mrs. Fr,an-
ces Smith in Provo (95)· After talking with the police, 
plaintiff had this automobile towed to the Hilltop Garage 
in Provo. When Mr. Devereaux learned, while .at work, 
that his automobile had been towed away, he left work 
(144). He vvent to the ho1ne of Mrs. Smith. She borrowed 
an automobile and drove him to the garage (156). Mr. 
Devereaux was getting his automobile as plaintiff drovP-
up (81). 1\{rs. Smith then left in the automobile she had 
borrowed and lVIr. Devereaux then left in his own, vvhere-
upon plaintiff started in a northerly direction on the 
highway leading from Provo to Orem. This was about 
ten P.M. (81). Mr. Devereaux drove to the home of Mrs. 
Smith and picked her up (156)· The next time plaintiff 
saw Mr. Devereaux was in Oren1 in the vicinity of J(irk's 
Drive-Inn. Mrs. Smith was in the automobile with him. 
He drove or swung his .automobile at plaintiff's automo-
bile a couple of times (82). Plaintiff decided to drive off 
the highway on the right hand side (82). Mr. Devereaux 
then drove his car in front of hers. She put on the brake 
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and just barely hit the Packard on the left-hand side (83). 
Mr. Devereaux stepped out of his automobile and came 
tow.ards plaintiff. At that time a highway patrolman 
passed by going in a northerly direction on the highway. 
Plaintiff started her automobile after him, honking her 
horn in an attempt to attract his attention (83). The 
patrolman finally pulled over to the side of the road and 
plaintiff did likewise ( 84). Plaintiff informed the officer 
of the difficulty she had been having and he told her he 
would take her back and for her to follo\Y him (84). 
The officer, Charles H. Allred, testified ( 29) : 
"A· Yes sir. I took and planned an escort for the 
lady, and told her that I would go back with 
her to see that everything "~as safe, and to 
follow my automobile after I had put the 
controls on, and stay right behind me, and we 
"\vould get a break in the traffic, and I would 
escort her back to the City of Orem." 
The controls \vere the big oscillating don1e lights on the 
roof of the patrol car. This light "~.as red. It turns in all 
directions and can be seen fron1 all directions ( 29). The 
officer looked for safet-Y. He did not drive out into the 
•' 
traffic until the drivers could discern his signals (30). 
Automobiles both north and south bound, respected the 
light and gave the officer the right of \Yay by stopping 
(30-42). He then made a ~~rq' turn to proceed southerly. 
At the time plaintiff drove over to the side of the 
road, her lights were on and she did not turn the1n off 
(85 ). With her signal lights, she signaled .a left-hand 
turn. She looked both ways and did not see <:ln auto1no-
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bile. She went to make the turn and an automobile hit 
her automobile on the left side between the door and 
the rear fender ( 85). The officer testified he made the 
turn and plaintiff attempted to follow behind hi1n. When 
he had completed his turn, he heard the cr.ash as another 
automobile \vas propelled into plaintiff's automobile ( 30). 
At the tune of the crash, the officer was on the west side 
of the highway in about the outside lane (39). He was 
headed south and h.ad just completed the "U" turn and 
vvas just west of two stopped automobiles when he heard 
the crash- The officer did not see the collision or defend-
ants' automobile before the crash ( 40). 
Joseph L. Breeze, immediately before the collision, 
was driving an auton1obile northerly in the second lane 
of traffic from the center line for northbound vehicles. 
As he approached this particular ,area, he saw a red light 
on the side of the road about two or three hundred feet 
ahead of him. He pulled over into the center lane (6G,67). 
The red light started to turn around in the middle of the 
road and he stopped to permit the turn to be made (67). 
These happenings occurred on the slope of what is 
known as Lindon Hill. The officer estimated th.at he 
stopped about half way between the crest of the hill and 
the bottom ( 36,37). 
Defendant Mcl{eever lived in Salt Lake City anc1 was 
an employee of defendant General Electric Company. He 
had spent the afternoon and e.arly evening playing golf 
at the Country Club in Provo. He played from two 
o'clock until approximately eight or eight thirty. After 
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he ca1ne into the club house he had a couple of drinks of 
whiskey (134). He left the golf club about nine o'clock 
and went to dinner. He left the restaurant at approxi-
mately ten o'clock and started north on highw.ay 91 to-
wards Salt Lake City (135). He testified that he was 
driving northward at approximately fifty miles an hour 
when he came over the rise of a hill and then things hap-
pened so fast that his recollection w.as hazy (136). He 
kne,v, as he was driving along, that he was approaching 
a hill and he knew that there was 1nore danger in driving 
to,vard a hill than 1nerely driving along a str.aight level 
road ( 140) · When he reached the cre'St, he saw automo-
biles at an estilnated two hundred feet ahead of him (136, 
140). He saw the officer's ear 'Yith the light on top 
(140). He was driving in the lane closest to the middle 
of the road. He observed a ear stopped in that lane 
and turned to the right to avoid hitting it. He clipped it as 
he passed and then collided with plaintiff's automobile 
( 67,141). 
Highway patrolman X eldon Evans 1nade measure-
lnents after the collision. Fron1 debris and brake marks 
and n1arks fro1n that point to "~here the ears finally 
came to rest, the officer deter1nined the location of the 
point of impact. There is a drive"~ay east of the high-
way which appears on Exhibit 4. He placed the point of 
ilnpact seven feet north of the north edge of this driveway 
and seven feet east of the line dividing the two north-
bound traffic lanes (55). These lanes ,Yere twelve feet 
'vide. Br:ake n1arks extended fron1 the point of impact 
in a southerly direction for sixty feet. .... ~ t the southerly 
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point of these brake marks, the "'"Weistern most started 
about a foot from the center line of the highway and 
extended in ~a diagonal direction to the point of impact 
in the eastern lane of northbound traffic (56). The offi-
cer estimated the point of impact to be from two to three 
to four hundred feet from the crest of the hill ( 60). 
Plaintiff's .automobile came to rest facing in an east-
erly direction forty-four feet north from the point of 
i1npact to the side of the automobile and ten feet nine 
inches east from the middle line of the northbound traffic 
lanes to the rear of plaintiff's car (58). McKeever's auto-
Inobile also came to rest heading in an easterly direction. 
The side of his automobile was twenty feet north of the 
point of imp.act. The rear end of his automobile was two 
feet seven inches east from the middle line of the north-
bound traffic (57,58). 
Patrolman Evans talked with McKeever at the scene 
of the collision. 1\icKeever said that he was going be-
tvveen fifty and sixty miles per hour and that he was with-
in two hundred feet of the danger when he first noticed 
it ( 52,53). The patrolman could smell alcohol on his 
bre.ath. He staggered a little and his talk was a little 
thick ( 53,54). Because of this, the patrolman questioned 
him about drinking. He told the officer that he had gone 
to Provo for supper and had a few drinks. He was asked 
where he was and he stated that he was at Draper, and 
that he remembered going past the point of the mountain 
( 53,54). The place where the collision occurred is some 
twenty to twenty-five miles south of Draper. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT. I 
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED HER RIGHT TO A JURY 
TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND 
APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INTRODU·CED 
WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A FINDING THAT DEFEND-
ANTS WERE NEGLIGENT IN THE OPERATION OF THE 
AUTOMOBILE AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE PROXI-
r./IATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PLAINTIFF 
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGEN·CE AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
ARGU~IENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED HER RIGH'T TO A JURY 
TRIAL IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND 
APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES. 
The trial eourt subrnitted this ease to the jury for its 
verdict. It returned a verdiet in favor of plaintiff. There-
after the court granted defendants, n1otion for a judg-
rnent notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgn1ent 
in favor of the defendant no cause of aetion. To support 
this ruling it rnust be found that the evidenee \Vas entirely 
insufficient to support .a finding in favor of plaintiff 
and required a judgn1ent £or defendants. This ruling-
denies to plaintiff her right to a jury trial. 
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This Court in Stickle v. Union Pacific R. Co. (Utah) 
251 p. 2d 867 (1952) made a splendid statement of the 
right of a citizen to a trial by a jury. This. Court there 
stated: 
"The court should exercrse c.aution and for-
bearance in considering taking questions of fact 
from the jury. 
"In our democratic system, the people are the 
repository of power whence the law is derived; 
from its initiation and cre.ation to its final applica-
tion and enforcement, the law is the expression of 
their will. The functioning of a cross-section of 
the citizenry as a jury is the method by which the 
people express this will in the applic.ation of law to 
controversies which arise under it. Both our con-
stitutional and statutory provisions assure trial by 
jury to citizens of this state. 
"Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arro-
gate to themselves arbitrary and dangerous pow-
ers by presuming to determine questions of f.act 
which litigants have a right to have passed upon 
by juries. Part of the merit of the jury system is 
its safeguarding against such arbitrary po,ver in 
the courts. To the great credit of the courts of this. 
country, they have been extremely reluctant to in-
fringe upon this. right, and by leaving it unimp,air-
ed have kept the administration of justice close 
to the people. Of course, the rights of litigant~s 
should not be surrendered to the arbitrary will of 
juries without regard to whether there is a viola-
tion of legal rights as a basis for recovery. The 
court does have a duty .and a responsibility of su-
pervisory control over the action of juries which 
is just as essential to the proper administration 
of justice as the function of the jury itself. N eve~r-
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theless, we remain cognizant of the vi~al import-
ance of the privilege of trial by jury In our sys-
tem and deem it our duty to zealously protect and 
preserve it." 
Another excellent statement of the rule is found in 
Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219, 134 
Pac. 567, 570. 
"Where, therefore, the circumstances are such 
that it may reasonably be said that different 
minds, in viewing and considering the evidence, 
might arrive at different conclusions with respect 
to whether or not the injured person exercised 
ordinary care, the question Df negligence must of 
necessity be determined as one of fact and not of 
law- \Vhile the susbta~ce of the foregoing state-
ment is often found in the books and may be said 
to be a correct statement of the doctrine, yet such 
statements often leave the reader in doubt whether 
a given case falls within or without the doctrine. 
But, notwithstanding this, it is ilnpossible to form-
ulate a rule by which all cases can be determined. 
"All that can be said is that, unless the ques-
tion of negligence is free fron1 doubt, the court 
cannot pass upon it as a question of law; that is, 
if after considering all tl1e evidence and the in-
ferences that may be deduced therefrom the court 
is in doubt whether reasonable 1nen in viewing and 
considering all the evidence, might arrive at dif-
ferent conclusions, then this very doubt deter-
mines the question to be one of fact for the jury 
and not one of la'v for the court. The court can 
pass upon the question of negligence only in clear 
cases. All others 'Should be submitted to· the jury. 
The reason of this is .apparent from the fact that 
in this state all questions of fact are for the J·urv· 
.. ' 
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and therefore, unless it is clear that in viewing 
and considering the evidence reasonable minds 
might not arrive at different conclusions, the case 
should go to the jury." 
We submit the ruling of the court that the evidence 
'vas insufficient and required 'a judgment for defendants, 
constitutes a plain violation of plaintiff's right to a trial 
by jury secured to her by the Constitution of the State 
of Utah and by the foregoing authorities. 
POINT. II 
THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INTR.ODUCED 
WHICH WOULD SUPPORT A FINDING 'THAT DEFEND-
ANTS WERE NEGLIGENT IN THE OPERATION OF THE 
AUTOMOBILE AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE PROXI-
MATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
We do not anticipate that there will be any conten-
tion made by defendants that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support a finding that defendant McKeever 
was guilty of negligence as he drove his car in a northerly 
direction and into the automobile of plaintiff. 
By Instruction No. 4 ( 11-12) the trial court sub1nitted 
two grounds of negligence. One was speed and the other 
failure to keep a proper look-out. 
The testimony established that the highway .at this 
point was in a fifty mile speed zone (53). Defendant 
McKeever admitted to the police officer that he 'vas 
driving between fifty and sixty miles per hour. Under 
applicable statutes this was prima facie evidenee that 
~fel(eever vvas driving at .a speed which was not then 
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reasonable, 1Jtah Code Annotated, 1953, section 41-6-46. 
On his cross examination he adn1itted he knew he was 
approaching a hill and knew that there was more danger 
approaching a hill th.an merely driving along a straight, 
level road ( 140). He took no precautions to bring his 
car under control so that he could stop it within the range 
of his vision. As a matter of fact, he clipped the· bumper 
of another car which had previously stopped to permit 
the police car to make the ""l--:-" turn- After clipping this 
car, he "\Vent on into the other lane of traffic and into the 
car driven by plaintiff. The statutes of this State require 
that a driver shall drive at an appropriately reduced 
speed when approaching a hill c.rest, l .... tah Code .... ~­
notated, 1953, section 41-6-46 (c). 
The conduct of the driver, Joseph Breeze, indicates 
that if defendant l\1cl(eever had been driving at a proper 
speed and had been keeping a proper lookout he would 
have been able to discern the situation that existed and 
would h,a-ve been able to bring his automobile to a stop 
short o ~ colliding with plaintiff. 
The evidence shows that Breeze sa'v the police car 
200 or 300 feet ahead of hin1, yet plaintiff laid down only 
60 feet of brake 1narks indicating that l1e 1nust not have 
been keeping a proper lookout or did not take steps to 
bring his car under eontrol and reduce its speed to a 
reasonable one under the facts and cireun1stances ,vhich 
faced him. 
We believe that there 'vas sufficient eYidence to sub-
Injt to the jury the proposition that defendant nfc.Kee-
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ver was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and, 
hence, was negligent in that regard. The evidence indi-
cated that he talked thick, th.a.t he staggered a little and 
that he smelled of liquor (53, 54). He believed that he 
was at Draper and stated he had passed the point of 
the mountain, when, as a matter of fact, he was t'venty 
to twenty-five miles to the south of that point .and had 
not reached the point of the mountain or Draper. 
The evidence supports a finding of proxirnate cause. 
If defendant had kept a proper lookout he would have 
been able to stop or bring his car under proper control 
and thus avoid the collision. A reasonable rate of speed 
would have permitted him to bring his ear to a stop and 
thus avoid the collision. This evidence supports a find-
ing of proximate· cause. 
We have concluded not to make any extensive argu-
ments on this proposition. Our remembrance is that de-
fendants did not contend an insufficiency of evidence to 
support a finding of negligence on defendants' part and 
proximate cause. However, we feel it necessary to refer 
to this evidence because the trial court in granting the 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict did not 
specify the particular ground upon which he ruled. 
vVe submit the evidence supports a finding that de-
fendants were negligent, proximately causing plaintiff's 
. . . 
illJUrleS. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING PLAINTIFF 
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GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER 
OF LAW. 
The record does not indicate the ground upon which 
the trial court ruled· Based upon comn1ents of the trial 
court and the argument of counsel, it is our belief the 
trial court ruled that plaintiff was guilty of negligence 
as a matter of law and that such negligence as a matter 
of law proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. Ordinarily, 
these two questions are questions which should be sub-
mitted to a jury for its consideration. The burden of 
proof, or as it is sometimes known, the burden of per-
suasion, is upon defendant to satisf3~ the jury by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that plaintiff was guilty of 
negligence and that such negligence proxi1nately caused 
her injuries. 
The recent case of Coo1nbs r. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 38L 
275 P. 2d 680 (1954) has 1nade a \ery clear statement 
of the test ·w·hich must be applied to the endence here. 
It is there stated: 
"The test we apply is ,, ... hether from all of the 
evidence re.asonable 1ninds could fairly say that 
they were not convinced by a preponderance of 
the evidence that she failed to use reasonable eare 
under the circum~stances and that this resulted in 
proximately contributing to cause her injury. Or, 
to state the proposition affirn1atively was the 
eviden:.e so clear and con1pelling that ~II reason-
able minds 1nust say that it \vas established bv a 
preponderance of the evidence that she \Yas negli-
gent and that such was a proximate cause of her 
injuries~" 
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Also in Stickle v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
(Utah) 251 P. 2d 867 (1952), the Court sert forth the 
tests which should be used in considering a contention 
such as is made by defendants in the case at bar: 
"It should be kept in 1nind that so far as the 
quantum of proof nece~ssary to t~ake the question 
of contributory negligence from the jury is con-
cerned, the tests are the same as with respect to 
primary negligence. For instance, in a given case, 
there may be some evidence upon which a finding 
of negligence by the defendant could be b.ased, yet 
the jury may remain in such a state of mind that 
they may fairly say that they are not convinced 
by preponderance of the evidence that the defen-
dant was negligent, and based upon such failure 
of proof may refuse to find a verdict against him. 
It would only be when the defendant's negligence 
had been established with such certainty that all 
reasonable men must conclude that he did not 
exercise re~asonable care, th:at the court would 
rule .as a matter of law that he w.as negligent and 
direct the jury to find a verdict against him; 
conversely, if evidence were such that reasonable 
men 1nay fairly s~ay that they are not convinced 
from a preponder.ance of the evidence that he was 
guilty of negligence, the court could not rule 
that he was negligent as a matter of law and t1ake 
the case from the jury. 
"The·se principles apply in identical fashion 
to the question of plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence except that the defendant has the burden of 
proof. That the evidence is such that the jury 
may find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the plaintiff failed to use due care for his 
own safe,ty is not sufficient. The proof must estab-
lish his failure to do so with such certainty that 
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all reasonable minds must so conclude before the 
court may rule as .a matter of law that he is pre-
cluded from recovery on that ground·" 
We will treat each of these propositions separately 
considering first the problem of negligence and second 
the problem of proximate cause. 
NEGLIGENCE 
In Instruction No. 5 ( 13, 14), the trial court sub-
mitted to the jury two grounds of negligence. First, he 
instructed the jury that if they found fro1n a preponder-
ance of the evidence that plaintiff attempted to make a 
"U" turn on U. S. Highv • .,..ay 91, at the time and plaee 
of the collision complained of, and upon the approach to 
or near the crest of a grade where such vehicle could not 
have been seen by the driver of any other vehicle ap-
proaching fron1 either direction \Yithin five hundred feet, 
and that such turn could not be made or accomplished 
with reasonable safety, then they could find that plaintiff 
was negligent. The second proposition submitted to the 
jury \vas that if the jury found, fron1 a preponderance of 
the evidence, that plaintiff atte1npted to 1nake a ~'1?' turn 
at the tune and place of the collision \vithout keeping a 
proper lookout for other persons or n1otor vehicles la\v-
fully using said highway, then the jury might find that 
plaintiff was negligent. 
Section 41-6-67 Utah Code ..:.lnnotated 1953 provides 
as follows: 
. "No veh_icle ~hall_ he turned so as to proceed 
In the oppos1te d1rect1on upon any eurve, or upon 
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the approach to, or near the crest of a grade, 
vvhere such vehicle e>annot be seen by the driver of 
any other vehicle approaching from either direc-
tion within 500 feet." 
There -vvas no evidence in this case which required 
a finding that plaintiff's automobile could not have been 
seen by the driver of .any other vehicle approaching from 
either direction within five hundred feet. There wa8 
evidence that the place where the "U" turn was attempted 
was anywhere from seventy-five feet to four hundred 
feet from the crest of the hill. It did not appear that 
the road south of the crest was on a downward grade 
toward the south. In other words, the jury could have 
found that as .a car \vas driving in a northerly direction 
approaching the crest of the hill, it was on a plateau and 
the view of such motorist would not necessarily be ob-
scured for five hundred feet or more. 
Also plaintiff was instructed by a police officer to 
follow him and he would escort her .after he had put 
the lights on the patrol ear and after there was a break 
in the traffic. The officer turned on his lights, the traf-
fic stopped and the officer made the "U'' turn followed 
by plaintiff. The statute was not meant to cover a situ.a-
tion such as this. A state strutute requires a motorist to 
comply with any lawful direction of police officer. Sec-
tion 41-6-13, Ut,ah Code Annotated, 1953. 
We submit there was no evidence requiring a find-
ing that there was a violation of thrs st,atute and hence 
the matter should have been left to the determination of 
the jury. 
Concerning her preparations to make the "U" turn, 
the testimony of plaintiff supports .a finding of 
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ordinary care and hence the second ground of negligence 
was a jury queistion. Plaintiff testified that while she 
was on the side of the road the patrolman told her to 
follow him. He put on the oscillating light on top of his 
automobile and made ready to make the "U" turn. He 
did not attempt to go in front of traffic until all traffic 
had stopped, both northbound and southbound. When he 
observed th~at he could turn in safety, he started to make 
the "U" turn. Plaintiff followed. She stated that be-
fore she moved, she put on the signal light indicating she 
was about to make a lefthand turn. She looked in both 
directions and saw no auton1obiles '.vhich constituted a 
danger. She then commenced to make the turn and after 
she entered the high,vay, the automobile driven by l\fc-
Keever collided with her auton1obile on the left side 
between the left rear door and the left rear fender. 
Pl~aintiff's .attention '\Yas demanded in more than one 
direction and in n1ore than one place. Since her attention 
could not be in all places and in all directions at once, 
it was of necessity a question of hun1an judgment hO"w 
her attention should be distributed an1ong the several 
competing de1nands. Plaintiff had to look north~ soutl1 
and west. It '-'"as for the jury to say '-'"'hether she used 
reasonable c:are in distributing her attention. 
This Court had held '.Yhere the attention of a nlotor-
ist must be distributed over several directions whether 
the motorist is negligent in her distribution is a question 
of fact for the jury. In lllartin v. Stevens, (Utah) 243 P 
2d 747, the collision occurred in an intersection and it 
was held a jury question as to due care on plaintiff's p.art 
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\Vas presented. Considering the distribution of atten-
tion the court s~ta ted : 
"We must remember that there were three 
other streets to give some attention to as he ap-
proached the intersection- All of the attention 
could not very well or safely be focused on any 
one at any given instant. Remaining aware of the 
others and giving them secondary attention, the 
plaintiff would look to the west, as he stated he 
did, to observe for the favored traffic to which he 
1nust give right of way, if any was near. He then 
looked to the east and saw no car within the extent 
of his vision, 150 to 200 feet. At th.a.t instant he 
was entitled to assume, absent anything to warn 
him to the contrary, that any car approaching 
from that direction would do so at a lawful rate 
of speed, that is, not ~to exceed about 25 miles per 
hour. He then changed his main attention back 
to the intersection and the south and west and pro-
ceeded. •J(c * * 
"As hereinabove suggested, we must avoid 
measuring the plaintiff's duty and charging him 
with negligence because he may have failed to 
anticipate and avert negligence on the part. of 
the defendant. We do not believe that it can he 
said that all reasonable minds must agree that the 
plaintiff's action in looking to the east and then 
proce,eding, relying on his right of way over 
traffic from that direction, and the assumption 
that any such traffic would not exceed a re.ason-
able and lawful rate of speed, amounted to negli-
gence on his part." 
In Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P 2d 680, 
this Court considered this same question in a pedestrian 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
cas.e but the same principle is applicable here. The court 
stated: 
"She must of course be w.atching for auto-
mobiles or other vehicles on the street, particularly 
from the north whence traffic was most likely to 
come. But due care requires that she also keep 
a lookout ahead for other pedestrians, possible 
holes or obstructions in the street, and at least 
remain aware of the possibility of other traffic, 
lest she be guilty of failing to use reasonable care 
for her own safety in regard to other dangers. 
For these reasons she obviously is not necessarily 
required, and likely in due care cannot give her 
entire at~tention to any one particular point of 
hazard. All that is required of her is that she use 
that degree of care which ordinary and reasonable 
persons usually observe under such circmnstances. 
"Under the evidence here the jury may well 
have found that when the plaintiff looked to the 
north there was no car approaching "ithin a 
distance of in1mediate hazard to her, and in view 
of the considerations .above discussed as to her 
right-of-way, and the necessity of remaining aware 
of other conditions around her~ that her conduct 
in placing some reliance upon the observation she 
made and proceeding 'Yest"~ard across the street 
was consistent "'ith her dutY of ordinarY and rea-
sonable care for her safety.~~ · 
In Hayden v. Ceder.l~tnd. 1 lTtah 2d 171, 263 P. 2d 
796 (1953), this Court refused to rule as n1atter of law 
that it constituted negligence for a driver of an auto-
mobile to give a signal for a left-hand turn and not 1nake 
any observation to the rear through a rear Yie"T 111irror 
or otherwise. I-Iere plaintiff testified that she not only 
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gave a signal, but that also she looked for both north 
and south bound traffic. 
The underlying reason for the ruling in the Hayden 
case is that plaintiff took some preeaution for his safety 
and whether it was enough to amount to reasonable care 
was for the jury to decide. This principle is well estab-
lished in this jurisdiction as is reflected in Stickle v. 
Union Pacific R. Co., (Utah), 251 P 2d 867, where plain-
tiff tested the tie band which passed over the tanks on 
a flat car by placing his weight upon it. He could have 
done 1nore to wscertain i1ts s~afe~ty. The court held the 
question of whether he did enough was for the jury. 
The case at bar is not one where plaintiff did no-
thing. She did something f~or her own safety and cer-
tainly went farther than did plaintiff in the Hayden case. 
See also Lloyd v. Southern Pacific Co., 111 Cal App. 
2d 626, 245 P. 2d 583, -vvhere it was held the evidence 
established that the driver of an automobile· in a cross-
ing accident had exercised some care and therefore the 
question of contributory negligence was for the jury. 
The court quoted at length from Koch v. Southern Calif· 
Ry. Co., 148 Cal. 677, 84 P. 176, the 1naterial part of 
which is as follows : 
" * * * * where it is shown that a plaintiff has 
exercised some care, the question whether or not 
the care actually exercised was due and sufficient, 
will always he a matter for determination by the 
jury." 
The court, referring to the Supreme Court, con-
cluded: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
" * * * * It thus appears that that court has 
now adopted or restated the rule of the Koch 
case, and we of course are bound to follow it if 
there is any evidence in this record that Lloyd 
exercised some care - whatever the quantum 
thereof." 
We have here the evidence that the officer told plain-
tiff to follow hin1 in making the "U" turn. He n1ade it 
successfully and plaintiff was merely following his lead, 
which she could do as a reasonably pr11dent person. 
While plaintiff testified she had no recollection of 
seeing other cars stopped on the highway, the jury could 
find she was actually R\Yare of them and because of being 
distraught did not recollect their presence. In an~~ event, 
seeing these cars stopped would give her added reason 
to make the turn and would lead to .an assurance upon 
which she could act as a reason·ably prudent person. In 
Hardman v. Thurman, (lTtah) 239 P. 2d 215, plaintiff 
driving south, made a left-hand turn in an intersection· 
'llhere \vere three lanes for northbound traffic. In the 
first two lanes east of the center line 'vere cars which 
were stopped. Defendant 'vas driving north in the third 
lane and collided 'vith plaintiff. The court held the ques-
tion of plaintiff's negligence "~as one for the jury and 
stated: 
"In the instant case, the jury 1night reason-
ably conclude· that "?hen the tanker truck stopped 
in the first lane east of tl1e center of State Street 
and another motor vehicle stopped in the second 
lane, Mrs. Hardman was in the exercise of reason-
able care in assuming that it "~as safe to proceed 
eastwardly." 
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\Ve subrnit th:at plaintiff's negligence, if any, was a 
question of fact t:o be determined by the jury. In this 
very case the question was at first submitted to the jury 
and the verdict for plaintiff established th.at eight citizens 
of this community believed plaintiff was not guilty of 
negligence. 
PROXIMATE CAUSE 
Even if we assume for the purpose of argument that 
plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, 
still the trial court erred because proximate cause 1n 
this case is a question of fact for the jury. 
Hayden v. Cederlund, 1 Utah 2d 171, 263 P. 2d 796, 
is very sin1ilar to the case at bar. There plaintiff's ver-
dict was by the trial court set aside and a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict entered for defendant. The 
judgment was reversed and the verdict reinstated. Plain-
tiff 'vas riding in a truck 'vith his son driving. The 
negligence of the son was imputable to plaintiff. The son 
was driving at a speed of approximately 15 miles per 
hour. The truck was hit in the rear by an automobile 
driven in the same direction by a peace officer at a speed 
of 45 or 50 miles per hour. The son testified he was going 
to make a left hand turn and about 100 feet before making 
the turn, he put out hi1s left ~arm, signaling the turn. Just 
before he turned an automobile p.assed him on the right 
side. The collision occurred as he commenced his turn 
at a time he 'vas from 3 to 15 feet beyond the center line. 
He heard no siren, saw no flashing light and did not look 
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to the rear or through the rear vision mirror at .any 
time after he signaled the turn. Defendant testified his 
siren and red flasher were ~operating and he saw no signal 
given by plaintiff's 1son. He was attempting to pass the 
truck to the left. When he realized it was turning to the 
left, he threvvr on his brakes .and laid do,vn 75 feet of 
brake marks before the impact. 
In holding that proximate cause -vvas a question of 
fact the court stated : 
"We have said that violation of a traffic law 
constitutes negligence as .a 1natter of law, but 
that such violation may not be the proximate cause 
of an injury. Without determining the correctness 
of the trial court's interpretation of the statute as 
applicable to the facts here, we believe in error the 
ruling that the driver's negligence, if any, because 
of violation of the statute or independently there-
of, "ras a proximate cause of the injury. 
"Viewing the evidence favoring the plaintiff, 
and recognizing that causation ordinarily is a 
matter for the jury unless reasonable minds could 
not differ as to its e:Aristence or the lack of it, we 
believe and conclude that tl1ere "~ere facts here 
relating to proxin1ate cause 'Yhieh~ if believed by 
the jury, were such that rea'sonable 1ninds could 
conclude that the end result 'Yas not efficiently 
caused or concurred in by the driYer's negligence. 
In this connection, a car passed on tl1e right just 
before the atte1npted turn, 'vhich, along "~ith other 
facts, may have given rise to a reasonable con-
clusion that those to the rear had seen and heeded 
the driver's signal. It is not unreasonable to 
anticipate th3::t no on~ 'vill atten1pt to pruss another 
on the left 1n an Intersection. Althou(Yh such 
0 
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anticipation of itself may not preclude a finding 
of negligence in a given case, other facts, such as 
the p.assing of a car to the right, failure of one 
intending to pass to give an audible or visible 
signal of such intention, the high speed of a car 
approaching from the rear, physical facts which 
may tend to show that one approaching from the 
rear may have attemp,ted to ch.ange his course and 
pass to the right of the truck (as another car a 
moment before had done), but was unsuccessful 
in the maneuver because of speed or miscalcula-
tion, in the aggregate may combine to make .a 
f.actual situation essentially for the jury in con-
junction with its privilege of appraising the credi-
bility of the witnesses and the character of the 
evidence. 
"The jury resolved doubt in favor of the plain-
tiff, and with deference to the learned trial court''s 
determination, we believe the f.acts do not demand 
a finding, as a matter of law, that the jury's con-
clusion was unreasonable or unfounded on compe-
tent evidence." 
Let us assume plaintiff did not keep a proper look-
out. Had she looked properly she should have seen the 
Breeze car and the southbound cars stopped. She would 
have believed th.at traffic had seen the police· car and her 
own and was giving them an opportunity to make the 
turn. The speed of the defendant''s auto1nobile and his 
failure to keep a lookout could have been regarded as the 
sole proximate cause of the collision. 
Another case closely analagous to this c.ase is Low-
der v· li alley) 120 lJtah 231, 233 P. 2d 350 (1951). Plain-
tiffs 'vere in an automobile driven by one of them in a 
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westerly direction and as he approached an intersection, 
he slowed to 10-15 miles per hour, looked north and south 
and saw no automobile. Defendant was driving his truck 
south and it hit the rear right side of plaintiff's auto-
mobile. A verdict and judgment for plaintiffs were af-
firmed. Defendant argued plaintiffs were guilty of con-
tributory negligence as matter of law. The court stated· 
"Appellants strenuously argue that respond-
ent Amasa Lowder's contributory negligence pre-
cludes both him and his wife from any recovery 
for damages and injuries. They argue that he 
failed to look and see Ruth Holley's truck before 
he entered the intersection and l1ad he looked he 
would have seen the truck and it would have been 
his duty to refrain from entering the inte-rsection 
until he could do so safely. Appellants are correct 
in stating that before entering an intersection the 
driver of a car must look and determine whether it 
is safe to enter. However, under the facts as the 
court found them, had Amasa Lowder observed 
the truck just before he entered the intersection 
he would have been justified in considering it safe 
to enter because .at that point, if tl1e truck \Yas 
being driven at the rate of 50 1niles per hour, and 
Amasa Lowder was driving at from 5 to 10 miles 
per hour, as the trier of the facts could reasonably 
have found, then the truck "rould haYe been at 
least 250 feet fron1 the intersection since his car 
had traveled .ahnost the entire distance across 
the intersection before the in1paet, and this being 
so he could have assumed and acted on the as-
sumption that the driver of the truck would ex-
ercise ordinary and reasonable care in its driving 
and that it \vould be safe to cross the intersection. 
Had Ruth Holley exercised such reasonable and 
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ordinary care the collision would not have occur-
red. Under such a state of facts Amasa Lowder's 
failure to see the truck could in no way have con-
tributed to the accident. The court, therefore, did 
not err in finding that Amasa Lowder was not con-
tributorily negligent." 
This quotation is clearly ,applicable to the case at bar. 
If plaintiff had seen the defendant's car some 300 or 400 
feet to the south, with other cars stopped, she could have 
assumed he \Vould also bring his car to a stop and could 
consider it safe to make the turn. Had the defendant1s 
here exercised reasonable care as did the other drivers, 
the collision \vould not have occurred. According to the 
Lowder case, this being so, proximarte causation was a 
question for the jury and defendants' negligence could 
have been the sole cause. 
In Gibbs v. Blue Cab, (Utah) 249 P. 2d 213 (on re-
hearing 259 P 2d 294), a cab collided \vith a bicycle. 
The rider of the bicycle w.as held by the trial court to be 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law be-
cause he had no lamp on his bicycle. The Supreme Court 
reversed. It held this was a violation of a city ordinance 
and a state statute "which established some negligence as 
a matter of law." The court then held proximate caus.e. 
was a question of fact, stating: 
"Assuming that in one aspect, by showing a 
violation of the city ordinance, defendant estab-
lished ~some negligence on the part of deceased 
as a matter of law, the problem remains .as to 
whether absence of the lamp under all the facts 
was or was not a contributing proximate cause 
of the collision, - particularly in view of the fact 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
that immediately prior to the time of ?np.act the 
bicycle, and therefore the lamp, was pointed a:vay 
from the vision of the defendant-a proper Jury 
question. 
"We are committed to the principle that mat-
ters of negligence, contributory negligence and 
proximate cause generally are jury questions, un-
less the evidentiary facts are of such conclusive 
character as to require all reasonable 1ninds to 
conclude that the ultimate fact of negligence, con-
tributory negligence or proximate cause does or 
does not exist." 
This court considered whether proxin1ate cause was 
a jury question in Hess v. Robinson,. 109 lltah 60, 163 
P. 2d 510 (1945). The trial court instructed the jury 
that both plaintiff and defendants \Yere guilty of negli-
gence as matter of la\Y but left to the jury the question 
of proximate cause. The jury returned a verdict for 
plaintiff. Defendants contended that the negligence of 
plaintiff was a proxin1ate cause of his injury as 111atter 
of la-\v. The verdict for plaintiff \Yas affirmed. 
Plaintiff was driving a truck south on an arterial 
highway. Defendants \\Tere driving an .a1nbulance east 
on an intersecting street. The court instructed the jury 
that plaintiff was negligent in not looking. In distinguish-
ing proxiinate cause and ren1ote cause the court stated: 
"By 'proxim·ate cause' is intended an act 
which directly produced, or coneurred dirertlv in 
producing, the injury. By 'ren1ote cause' is. in-
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tended that which may have happened and yet no 
injury has occurred, notwithstanding that no in-
jury could have occurred if it had not happened." 
It then started the consideration of whether plain-
tiff's negligence was a proxi1nate eause of the injuries 
.as 1natter of law by asking the following questions: 
"'The trial court instructed the jury that the 
plaintiff w.as negligent in not so looking. But does 
it follow as beyond dispute that had plaintiff 
looked and seen the ambulance approaching, rea-
sonable and prudent conduct would have dictated 
that he stop until the ambulance had crossed the 
intersection~ Are the f.acts revealed by the evi-
dence so clear and certain that the court could say 
that for plaintiff to drive into the intersection 
without stopping was not the act of an ordinarily 
prudent and careful man~" 
Asking and answering these same questions in the 
case at b.ar the same ans-vvers \Vould be forthcoming. If 
plaintiff had looked and had seen the oncoming defend-
ants' c.ar, she could have concluded that it would stop 
as had the other cars. The police car had made the turn 
in safety. It is not beyond dispute that had plaintiff 
looked and seen defendants' car approaching, reasonable 
prudent conduct would have dictated she not make the 
;- turn. The evidence is not so clear and certain that the 
m: court could say that for plaintiff to ~start the turn was not 
~~~ the act of an ordinarily prudent and careful person. 
Similar reasoning prevailed in Martin v. Stevens, 
1: (lTtah) 243 P. 2d 747, where proximate cause was held 
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to be a jury question. Plaintiff drove south and defendant 
west into an intersection. Defendant hit plaintiff broad-
side in the intersection. Plaintiff only saw defendant 
when the brakes were set just before the collision. The 
trial court granted defendants' motion to dismis'S and this 
was reversed. The court stated: 
"There is .also the question of proximate cause. 
Should we assume that all reasonable men must 
conclude that plaintiff's failure to keep more of a 
lookout to the east amounted to negligence, would 
they also all agreei that such failure to observe 
proximately caused the collision~ Suppose he had 
looked continuously to the east as he approached 
and proceeded into the intersection and had seen 
defendant coming. Could he not, within the limits 
of reasonable care, have assumed defendant would 
slow up and yield the right of 'Yay, or would the 
defendant's speed and proximit:~ to the intersec-
tion have been a 'varning to the plaintiff that he 
would not do so~ l~ nder the rulings in Hess v. 
L. 
Robinson; Lowder v. Holley; and Poulsen v. Man-
ne,ss, all cited above, this was also a jury ques-
tion." 
Other cases 'vhich support plaintiff's position are 
Dieckmann v. Signorini, 47 Cal. App. 2d 481, 118 P. 2d 
319; Shattuck v. Picku·ick Stages Corp., 135 Kan. 602, 11 
P. 2d 996; Ford v. TVilson, 107 Cal. App. 131, 290 Pae. 
120; Burns v. Stan.dring, 1-1-S ''"rash. 291~ 268 Pac. 866. 
We subrnit the evidence here supports a finding that 
if defendant nicKeever had reduced his speed as he 
should have done upon co1ning toward the crest of the hill 
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.and kept a proper lookout as he should have done and at-
tenlpted to bring his automobile under control before 
he did, this collision would never have occurred. We 
believe that under the authorities such a finding would 
permit the jury to also find that the negligence of defend-
ant was the sole proximate cause of the collision and that 
the negligence, if any, of plaintiff was the remote cause, 
if a cause at all. 
CONCLUSION 
A jury of eight citizens of Salt Lake County con-
cluded that under the instructions of the court the de-
fendants were negligent and the plaintiff was not guilty 
of contributory negligence. The trial court saw fit to 
exerci1se his power to nullify that determination. In so 
doing he has set his mind against eight minds on a fact-
ual determination. The exercise of such power is a seri-
ous course to pursue in the orderly trial of a law suit. 
It should only be done with great hesitation. 
We believe and submit that the trial court has de-
nied to plaintiff her right of tri~al by jury and that he has 
usurped the function of the jury. Under the foregoing 
authorities and argument the question of negligence, 
proximate causation and contributory negligence were 
all questions for the jury and the jury determination 
should have been respected and held to have been sup-
ported by the testimony in this case. 
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vV e respectfully ask that this Court reinstate the 
verdict of the jury and recognize ·and uph·old the function 
of the jury which it properly exercised in this case. 
We respectfully rusk this court to reverse the judg-
ment of no cause of action and remand the case to the 
District Court with instructions to reinstate the verdict 
and enter judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $5,199.90. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, \\:""ALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
Counsel for Appellant 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
I I 
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